In addition to equipment costs from the war, there remains a bill to be paid in medical costs as well. By 2008, over 1.6 million troops had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. 5 With over 300,000 returning troops suffering from major depression or post-traumatic stress disorder and at least 320,000 brain injuries received 6 , the costs of reconstituting the force, additional military family programs, and post-deployment medical issues that have not traditionally come out of the annual defense budget will have to be paid for several years to come.
In February 2010 the President presented his proposed 2011 budget to
Congress. In it, every funding line except for defense, which was increased by an additional $15 billion from the previous year"s budget, was frozen. When talking to reporters afterward, President Obama remarked on this fact by saying, "Even though the Department of Defense is exempt from the budget freeze, it's not exempt from budget common sense." While this is a bold move on the part of the Defense Department, it is too soon to tell if all of these things will actually take place. With over 2,800 military and civilian personnel and an additional 3,000 contractor jobs on the line, Virginia congressmen and senators from both parties have already resisted the need to shut down Joint Forces
Command. Citing the 1990 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act and its requirement to use the BRAC process for closing any command with more than 999 civilian employees, Virginia lawmakers universally believe that JFCOM cannot be dismantled so easily. Virginia is a traditional key swing state in presidential elections so it is debatable whether the incumbent administration will fight for the DoD plan, no matter how appropriate it is.
The average difference in defense spending between inflection points following the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War was 32 percent. (see Figure 1 .) 10 The current proposed reduction of 100 billion dollars represents only a 14 percent decrease. Even if Secretary Gates" plan is fully implemented, based on the lessons from past history, there will need to be more cuts. One of the most lucrative areas within defense acquisition that has considerable redundancies between the military departments is the area of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Current projected budgets across DoD of over $8.6 billion for unmanned aircraft systems plus nearly $2 billion for selected, manned airborne ISR systems highlight the importance of this area to the Defense Department. Eliminating redundancies within the military departments for ISR systems could result in significant savings to DoD and the Nation. In order to see these cost benefits, Congress will need to change the law to eliminate unnecessary redundancies. 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 $ Typically, however, these systems tended to follow service specific requirements which were unique from one another. During World War I, as artillery developed beyond the ability of direct fire, the U.S. Army used manned aircraft to spot targets for and assess the effects of indirect fire. 11 In a similar manner, during World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces used unarmed fighter aircraft, due to their speed, to fly behind enemy lines and conduct photo reconnaissance. 12 Over time, since World War I, the U.S. Navy has changed from using airships 13 
Evolution of U.S. Roles and Missions for Air Operations
Roles and missions cover every aspect of the military, but are especially relevant to airborne ISR operations since every service has air assets that must be able to work together. Like siblings who don"t always get along with each other, the three departments within the DoD sometimes find themselves in dispute over their place in the greater hierarchy. Nowhere is that more apparent, than between the Army and the Air Force who come from a common heritage, but often find themselves at odds over redundant capabilities.
One of the main reasons the Army has differed so often with the Air Force on traditional "roles and missions" is because of the perceived tendency on the part of the Air Force to prioritize strategic and operational objectives over tactical aims. Since so much of its success is based on its ability to win the close fight, the Army is not willing to accept anything short of a guaranteed capability for ground tactical commanders when needed. For this reason, when it comes to UAVs, the Army has invested heavily in unmanned systems redundant to those of the Air Force.
Although the Army has a long track record of using light, fixed-wing aircraft in an intelligence gathering role, its decision to purchase a UAV with Predator-like capabilities and its plan to arm it with missiles caused much concern within Air Force circles believing that the Army was violating established roles and missions of the Air Force. In 2005, the Air Force made a quiet but concerted effort to establish themselves as the Executive Agent (EA) for all UAS within the Pentagon. As the EA they would be responsible for the oversight of all DoD unmanned aircraft vehicles. Executive agency efforts would include research, development, test and evaluation activities, procurement, logistics, and training to "achieve efficiencies and gain effectiveness." The military services were aware that their future would be influenced in large measure by the division of funds among them-and these funds were severely limited prior to the Korean War. After 1947, therefore, the defense dollar was one of the major factors of military life in Washington. 37 Although money was and continues to be an influence on strategy within the Departments, it is not the sole factor. With the advent of the U.S. Air Force, there was a concern from the Navy in particular regarding the loss of its air mission-and there was precedence for this apprehension. John Correll points out that, Boards headed by Lords Curzon Cowdray, they all pointed to the same conclusion. A Short History of the Royal Air Force points out that, "All were very much concerned with the supply problems, but it became increasingly clear that some form of unity was needed if the supply problem was to be overcome." 40 President Truman hoped the departments could find a unified solution, but when that failed to happen, in 1946, he forged ahead with his own plan which was seen by naval proponents as limiting naval air power. He stated that naval aviation should be given every "opportunity to develop to its maximum usefulness," yet land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping should be manned by Air Force personnel. 41 In the end, due to a counter proposal drafted by and agreed to by the Army and the Navy, concessions were made in which the Navy was allowed to keep its complete air service 42 .
Even though it had just released the Air Force from its ranks, the U.S. Army still had a significant stake in maintaining an independent air arm. From its experiences coming out of the Korean War, many Army leaders felt that future conflicts would require substantial tactical air support, including tactical airlift and did not believe that the newly formed Air Force provided such support. 43 "Many ground commanders continued to feel that the Army should have exercised more control over the air units.
They were supported in this belief by Marine and Navy critics, who argued that that their own system of tactical air support was superior." 44 The Marine Corps tactical air system had its beginnings in World War I and evolved into a doctrine in which air power was considered an extension of Marine artillery. Current Marine doctrine states that "aviation increases the firepower and mobility of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and makes up for their lack of weapons. Aviation relieves some of the burden on ground combat units to move and carry large amounts of ordnance." 45 The solution crafted entitled the Army to have whatever aircraft it required stipulating that the Army would use its aircraft "as an integral part of its components for the purpose of expediting and improving ground combat and logistical procedures within the combat zone." 46 It defined the combat zone as "that part of the theater of operations required for the conduct of war by the fielded forces," and understood that the combat zone would not normally exceed 50 to 75 miles in depth. Although agreements are made within the constraints of the JCIDS process, in the end, when resources are constrained, it"s difficult to keep teams together. Often one service or more will drop out of a joint procurement program leaving its partner to go it alone. 53 Although cost savings can be found at the macro level, one military department or the other will often end up paying for attributes that it doesn"t need or want and will opt out of the program. Currently, there exist few incentives to make a military department stay in a program once it has committed to it in the Joint Requirements
Oversight Committee (JROC).
In The main reason these redundancies exist in these manned and unmanned programs is that the Army lacks confidence in the Air Force"s commitment to maintain these programs and have them available when and where the Army needs them. 55 Critics say, "The U.S. can"t afford the trend of building parallel fleets of Army and Air The final course of action proposed has been presented many times in the past, but, due to the inter department mistrust that exists regarding this issue, has never come to fruition. Nevertheless, it is a viable option. If one department was vested as the executive agency (EA) for all airborne ISR procurement, it could eliminate the redundancies that currently exist. Due to the fact that one department would control the purse strings, however, this solution would always be viewed as skewed to the department designated as EA.
Recommendation
The Department of Defense and the United States would best be served with a joint headquarters solution. Particularly, since the vast majority of funding in this area is in the unmanned arena, an organization like the JUAS-COE is particularly well suited for this role. A joint headquarters organized for this role is able to determine each military department"s procurement requirements in terms of both the joint and service oriented concept of operations (CONOPS) and it is extremely familiar with all unmanned programs. Given the similar mission of Project Liberty and Task Force ODIN to those of unmanned aircraft systems, a joint headquarters can very easily add manned airborne ISR programs to their portfolio. The broader implications of this recommendation are significant and should be thoroughly studied prior to acting. This decision would fundamentally change the way in which we have always funded acquisition. With the exception of the decision to authorize USSOCOM its own ability to procure equipment, no other joint headquarters has ever been in control of procurement funding. Doing so would require a change to public law, specifically the Title 10 authority for service procurement within each department. Changing the system will not be a simple process since there is equipment unique to each Service that might not be appropriately managed under a joint procurement policy. However, if the government is to effectively deal with the burgeoning cost of defense, it must be willing to rethink how it operates. 
